William L. Neumann

This article is based on information disclosed by the congressional Pearl Harbor inquiry. It discusses the confusion that reigned in the White House and among  congressional leaders in the hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

This article maintains that an attitude of nationalistic superiority led American leaders to be overconfident that Japan would not attack the U.S. prior to Pearl Harbor. Neumann argues against the revisionist perspective that a Roosevelt conspiracy led to Pearl Harbor and instead fixes the blame on bungled handling of military intelligence.

This article argues against the revisionist explanation for the attack on Pearl Harbor, but proposes that Roosevelt believed that the U.S. must go to war with Germany and Japan and that he felt that the American people were unprepared for war.

This article covers events leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor, the reasons behind the Japanese decision to attack, and the allocation of responsibility for the surprise attack. It emphasizes that the failure was not due to individual incompetence but rather systemic issues in Washington and Pearl Harbor, with a lack of comprehensive intelligence sharing and coordination.

The article recounts the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor  which marked a pivotal moment in world history. Despite signs of impending war, such as intercepted Japanese messages and the movement of Japanese forces, the U.S. was caught off guard, leading to significant devastation. The article emphasizes the strategic missteps and the lack of preparedness that contributed to the success of the Japanese attack.

This article, written by a retired vice admiral of the Imperial Japanese Navy, recounts the attack on Pearl Harbor from the Japanese perspective. It analyzes the attack from a tactical standpoint.

The article analyzes the situation in Japan in the lead up to the attack on Pearl Harbor. It notes that in hindsight, Japan's decision to go to war with the U.S. might have seemed like an act of folly. In fact, from the Japanese perspective, the expectation was that the U.S. would be willing to negotiate for peace rather than fight a prolonged war.

This article, written by the former wartime foreign minister of Japan, is an excerpt from a book titled The Cause of Japan. It provides  a historical perspective on the attack on Pearl Harbor from a Japanese governmental viewpoint.